The list of institutions and individuals that will be hurt by the looming sequester reaches into every aspect of American life and commerce. Virtually every one of us will be negatively impacted by these cuts. From individuals dependent on public support through no fault of their own, to landlords waiting for their next tenant, to the men and women defending this nation and its ideals, there are costs that will be felt unevenly. None of this is a surprise; it is by design. 

When the sequester was first devised, the idea was to impose a deadline for resolution of a fundamentally unsound fiscal position. Given Congress' repeated failures in reaching compromise, it was acknowledged that a deadline by itself would not suffice. The Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction was tasked with developing an economically rational, long-term solution that would cut $1.2 trillion from the budget over the next decade. That inaptly named Supercommittee conceded to gridlock in November 2011, kicking off the countdown to the current state of affairs. At that juncture, it was the President who stated emphatically that he would “veto any effort to get rid of those spending cuts,” perhaps hoping to incent the Congressional leadership.

Few people will argue that sequestration is the best possible path forward. They are easily outnumbered by people who will argue it is the most reckless. The recovery is firming, gaining new traction as housing rises finally from its nadir. But it is a recovery that remains susceptible to shocks. Under current circumstances, the best possible path forward is one that balances the need for long-term fiscal sustainability with the immediate challenges of getting Americans back to work.

So the very officials who demanded we put a damaging sequester in place are now campaigning that it makes no sense, will be the wrong path for the country, and must be abandoned. If the alternative to the sequester was a newfound spirit of compromise in Congress that would one day lead to a more rational, sensible fiscal path, we might all agree to set the sequester aside. But Congress has had more than a year to address the fundamental unsustainability of the deficit in a rational, sensible way; even with the threat of sequester hovering over them, they have failed.

We can talk at length about the wisdom of a measured approach to deficit reduction that is sensitive to current economic and labor market conditions. Fed Chairman Bernanke argued correctly at this week's Humphrey-Hawkins testimony that the negative impact of the sequester on economic activity would make deficit reduction harder, at least in the short run. Instead, he offered that “Congress and the Administration should consider replacing the sharp, frontloaded spending cuts required by the sequestration with policies that reduce the federal deficit more gradually in the near term but more substantially in the longer run.”

If Congress would take his advice and act on it, our collective sense of disenfranchisement with Washington would evaporate. With regret, there is scant reason to believe the current Congress will be so mindful of the public interest. The increasingly entrenched positions of Washington's many constituencies – along with their mixed incentives – make it impossible for us to assume blindly that rationale compromise will carry the day.

Therein lies the problem. Arguing to undo the sequester assumes that Congress will, given more time and just one more chance, eventually come to agreement even though they have failed repeatedly to do just that. Instead, the implications of irresponsible public finance – that its cost will one day be more tangible than abstract – are about to slap us in the face. Has Washington's behavior over the last few months given any indication of a new maturity or capacity for a grand bargain? If so, no effort should be spared in striking sequester from the threats to our prosperity.

If only it were so. The case for absolving Congress of any consequences for its ineptness is a tough case to make. It is one that puts us back onto a slow, inexorable erosion of our national potential, where indebtedness is not a crisis until the crisis is palpable and the costs of correction much higher and more painful than they are today. On the other hand, if the sequester becomes a reality for the American people, a fractured electorate might finally demand the better governance that will, at the appropriate time, result in measured tightening of the public purse. This leaves us with a grim prospect: the sequester is a terrible option, it is the wrong option, but for the moment it may be the best option we have.